Remove Copying Remove Definition Remove False Advertising Remove Trademark Law
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Griper’s Keyword Ads May Constitute False Advertising (Huh?)–LoanStreet v. Troia

Technology & Marketing Law Blog

” This definition of a service is an obvious tautology, and it’s also obviously in tension with the First Amendment. And how can consumers be “diverted” with the ad copy accurately previewed what consumers could expect to get at the link terminus? None of this is diversion; it’s consumer education.

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Internal Search Results Aren’t Trademark Infringing–PEM v. Peninsula

Technology & Marketing Law Blog

The trademark owner argued that the customers may have been directed via initial interest confusion to the rival website. The court says there can’t be MULTIPLE instances of INITIAL interest confusion: By definition, initial interest confusion is “confusion that creates initial customer interest.” LoanStreet v.

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The SHOP SAFE Act Is a Terrible Bill That Will Eliminate Online Marketplaces

Technology & Marketing Law Blog

.” Clearly, the second part of that definition targets Amazon and other major marketplaces, such as eBay, Walmart Marketplace, and Etsy. The first part of the definition includes services with “publicly interactive features that allow for arranging the sale or purchase of goods.” Lack of State Preemption.

Trademark 137
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WIPIP: Innovation Theory & TM

43(B)log

Copying may be directly costless to the knowledge creator, but knowledge transfer is not, and who is initiating may affect what’s going on here: knowledge transfer encodes voluntariness which fits with Cicero but not with a lot of the copying to which people object today. I don’t think that’s true either. 3) Functionality.

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A Look Back at India’s Top IP Developments of 2023

SpicyIP

The Court held that “diagnostic” under Section 3(i) should neither be construed narrowly, limited to only in-vivo or definitive diagnosis, nor broadly to include any process “relating to” diagnosis. The central issue here was whether Section 3(i) is restricted to only in vivo tests practices on the human body. HULM Entertainment v.

IP 124